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Layer 6 · The blind host model

Canonical reference: hub services/retrieval/src/bin/bootstrap.rs (blind read/write), services/resolver (the resolver), services/api (the /v1 control plane). DIG's hub is a provider-blind host plus three trust planes.

The blind invariant​

The hub holds only ciphertext keyed by retrieval_key — no URN, no decryption key. It relays the capsule's serve_blind output verbatim (a real hit OR the capsule's own indistinguishable decoy) and cannot tell hit from miss. The trusted root comes only from the chain, never from the serving origin.

Plane A — blind read/write at rpc.dig.net​

serve_blind (framing-only decode)​

serve_via_runtime (bootstrap.rs:1489-1633): fetch the .dig for (store, root) from the modules bucket (staging fallback for the read-before-promote window), check magic \0asm + size ≤ 256 MiB, then run the module's serve for the 32-byte key inside HostRuntime under §18.2 ExecutionLimits (fuel/epoch/384-MiB). The host decodes the ContentResponse framing only — NOT decryption; ciphertext stays sealed. It does not verify the proof and does not judge presence.

A None is returned only for a genuine infra failure (no host seed / module absent / trap / undecodable) → a uniform -32004; the hub never fabricates a miss.

Response key-cache​

Root-pinned (store, root, retrieval_key, aligned-range) only — verbatim serve_blind output, LRU/size-capped, no TTL (immutable). Only an explicit concrete root is cacheable; "latest"/absent reads are never cached.

Push trust = accept-on-signature​

The §21 push write path applies two gates: §21.9 identity auth (any valid identity) + ownership (verify_push_owner: BLS verify over SHA-256(PUSH_DST || new_root || store_id) against the store's registered store_pubkey).

Accept-on-signature push trust

The write trust model is accept-on-signature: a store the hub doesn't yet host is auto-created headless/Unlisted with a trust-on-first-use store_pubkey, reconciled later by the anchor-watcher. This is safe because readers verify against the on-chain coinset root client-side — an unanchored head simply won't verify (treated as not-found) until the publisher anchors the singleton.

Plane B — the resolver (*.on.dig.net + custom domains)​

BASE_ZONE = "on.dig.net". subdomain_of requires exactly one label before on.dig.net; render_for(domain) → Loader | Available | Pending | Expired | Revoked. The loader embeds window.__DIG__ = { storeId, root, salt, rpc: "https://rpc.dig.net/", subdomain } (with </ → <\/ script-breakout escape). Custom domains: CloudFront preserves the viewer host in x-dig-host; a CUSTOMDOM#<host> row maps an external FQDN to a linked subdomain when status == "active". Hard rule: never set a Domain=.dig.net cookie; the sandboxed preview origin is {store}.usercontent.dig.net.

Plane C — the /v1 control plane​

  • Login (CHIP-0002). POST /v1/auth/challenge issues a single-use challenge (message "dighub-login:v1:<nonce>:hub.dig.net:<ts>", 120s TTL); POST /v1/auth/verify atomically consumes it (replay-proof), binds ph_from_key == ph_from_addr, and BLS-AugScheme-verifies over the CHIP-0002 signed-message hash.
  • Sessions. EdDSA JWT (iss=hub.dig.net, aud=dighub-api|dighub-cli, access TTL 900s) + an opaque refresh token (sha256-stored, 30d). Refresh rotation with RFC-6819 family reuse-detection: a presented hash that ≠ the current one revokes the family + 401; rotation is atomic (closes the concurrent-refresh TOCTOU). Bearer auth pins Algorithm::EdDSA + iss + audience and requires a live, non-revoked server-side Session row (real logout).
  • High-impact action re-auth. POST /v1/auth/action issues a 300s action challenge (store_delete|store_transfer|account_reset); verify_action requires a fresh wallet signature, not a bearer.
  • GitHub-OIDC keyless CI auth. POST /v1/auth/ci/github-oidc (the OIDC token IS the auth): verify fail-closed (RS256 pinned, iss/aud/exp checked, alg:none rejected) → resolve repository@ref → require a registered binding → require the bound store still exists + is still owned → mint a scoped aud=dighub-cli session (no refresh, 900s).